2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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President: Mr. Cabactulan ..... (Philippines)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Ashton** (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the stabilization and association process countries; the potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, expressed the European Union's conviction that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), based on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, represented a unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. It was the duty of all to maintain and strengthen its authority and integrity and to continue to advocate its universality. In that connection, the European Union welcomed Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the high-level meeting in September, and the significant new treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on strategic arms reduction, which would, it was to be hoped, be followed by further engagement on other strategic issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation. The European Union was convinced that intermediate steps towards a safer world without nuclear weapons could lead to significant increases in security for all and reaffirmed its commitment to treaty-based nuclear arms control and disarmament, including a renewal of multilateral efforts and a reactivation of multilateral instruments, in particular the Conference on Disarmament.

2. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime was a key priority and the European Union was gravely concerned at the major proliferation challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had continued to violate their international obligations in clear defiance of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite repeated offers by the international community to discuss the issues and work towards a diplomatic solution. Undeniably, each country had the right to define its own energy strategy and had the inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with its NPT obligations. The European Union, as a major provider of international assistance, would continue to cooperate actively with third countries and provide its full support to IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme with a view to promoting international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting nuclear safety and security and strengthening effective safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation.

3. The European Union had come to the 2010 Review Conference with a firm determination to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to help build consensus for a successful outcome based on a balanced approach to the three pillars in the review of the operation of the Treaty and on the adoption of a set of balanced, effective and consensual measures aimed at stepping up international efforts to combat proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The European Union continued to support the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Given the importance of the universality of the Treaty, the European Union called on all States not yet parties to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and, in the meantime, to abide by its terms and pledge their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament.

5. The Council of the European Union had recently adopted a decision identifying various priorities to be addressed by the Review Conference, including a reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to comply with their obligations and to fulfil the Treaty's goals; the strengthening of the implementation of the Treaty through the adoption of a set of effective consensual measures to promote the NPT pillars and to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; a reaffirmation of the commitment to achieve concrete progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty; the strengthening of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the non-proliferation regime by making the conclusion of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol the verification standard; the strengthening of the Treaty through a common understanding by States parties on how to respond effectively to a withdrawal from the Treaty and to cases

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of non-compliance; and the broadening of support for the concept of the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety and non-proliferation conditions, including a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle.

6. **Mr. Bildt** (Sweden) said that the Review Conference should seek to reinforce the commitment of the international community to take concrete steps that could give the Non-Proliferation Treaty credibility and strength. Sweden was working for the success of the Conference as a member of the European Union and of the New Agenda Coalition.

7. There had been important advances in the past year towards the goal that united all States, in particular the Security Council summit meeting in September, the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and the successful Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. The treaty concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation was of great importance, both substantively and symbolically, in terms of the reductions agreed upon and in terms of demonstrating that nuclear weapons were increasingly weapons of the past. Members of the New Coalition urged the United States and the Russian Federation to engage in talks also on the reduction and eventual elimination of their sub-strategic nuclear arsenals.

8. The international community needed to strengthen its efforts to prevent new nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and to ensure that the Treaty was respected fully and by all. Sweden was deeply concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had continued its policy of withdrawal from the Treaty and had even tested two nuclear devices in violation of Security Council resolutions. That country must be convinced to end its confrontation with the international community.

9. No one sought to deny the Islamic Republic of Iran the same rights as every other member of the Treaty, including the right to nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle, but a dark cloud of suspicion would hang over that country until it had clarified all open issues associated with its nuclear activities. That could only be done through full cooperation with IAEA in every respect. Adherence to the Additional Protocol would go a long way towards establishing trust in Iran's activities. Confrontation was in the interest of no one and cooperation was the way forward.

10. Sweden supported a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The international community must be united in its determination to avoid any step that could jeopardize that objective and must be ready to discuss steps leading towards it.

11. He stressed the importance of making the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to every nation that desired it. In spite of its dependence on nuclear power, Sweden had never seen the need to invest in the complete nuclear fuel cycle, even though that would be well within its technological capabilities. Sweden strongly supported the work by IAEA on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. The vision of a world where every nation that so wished had access to peaceful nuclear energy was well within reach.

12. **Mr. Moratinos** (Spain) said that the current Review Conference was an opportunity that must not be missed to renew and strengthen the Treaty. The international community needed to come to an agreement on an ambitious action plan that would advance nuclear disarmament, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthen the security of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. The Government of Spain was firmly committed to contributing to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to working towards the definition of a consensus based on concrete and irreversible steps towards the fulfilment of the goal sought by so many peoples and nations. The current momentum in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be sustained in support of proposals that encouraged multilateralism and sought new consensus and international agreements. The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) by heads of State and Government in September 2009 had been an enormously positive step outlining an ambitious and complex agenda.

14. All States shared the belief that security and disarmament were complementary and mutually reinforcing. New threats to international peace and security were linked to proliferation of and illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, terrorist groups and States outside or in violation of international law. At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April, participating States had recognized that nuclear terrorism was one of the most serious threats to international security and

required the maintenance of the highest standards of nuclear security as a preventative measure.

15. The 2010 Review Conference was opening in a spirit of optimism that the international community could forge a new consensus to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime embodied in the Treaty. He was convinced that the renewed political drive would result in the adoption of a balanced political document reflecting advances in and strong commitments to the Treaty's three pillars, which would lead to a more secure world free of nuclear weapons in which the inalienable right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was guaranteed.

16. At the present time, nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in article VI of the Treaty, had become a realistic ambition thanks primarily to the political will shown by nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference was beginning at an auspicious moment of positive advances between the two nuclear-weapon States that held 95 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The new agreement on strategic arms reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States of America was a very positive step that should open the way to new rounds of global nuclear arms reduction, both strategic and sub-strategic. The new Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States Government was also a significant step towards the establishment of a new climate. Spain welcomed the decreased role of nuclear weapons in security strategy and the commitment not to develop new nuclear weapons, as well as the commitment by the United States to the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in May 2009 to launch the negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

17. Spain supported efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The entire international community, in particular the three countries that had still not acceded to the Treaty, must abide by its terms. It was also crucial to devise appropriate measures in the event of a notice of withdrawal from the Treaty, as in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in conformity with article X, with the goal of preserving the authority and integrity of the Treaty, and of respecting compliance with the safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

18. Mechanisms must be found to advance towards the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in order to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region, which would represent a new advance in the Middle East peace process and strengthen mutual trust among the countries of the region and regional and global security. Spain supported the appointment of a special coordinator for the Middle East and the convening of a diplomatic conference, possibly in 2011, which would be a step towards the objective set in the 1995 resolution and would have a positive impact on the development of the peace process.

19. The international regime to combat nuclear proliferation must be strengthened by further vigorous support of the authority of IAEA, including the strengthening of its verification and monitoring capabilities. Spain, along with the entire European Union, supported the universal implementation of the Additional Protocol in conjunction with safeguards agreements as the new verification standard, which would strengthen transparency and confidence-building measures for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

20. There had been several instances of nuclear proliferation that represented serious failures in NPT compliance, namely, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The relevant resolutions of the Security Council must be complied with in order to restore the confidence of the international community and strengthen regional stability and security. Spain therefore urged those two countries to comply forthwith with international law.

21. Spain affirmed the right of every country to develop civilian nuclear programmes in conformity with the Treaty and sought therefore to promote mechanisms aimed at ensuring the responsible use of nuclear energy in the best conditions of security, safety and non-proliferation. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank, should not be perceived as new constraints on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but rather as cost-effective initiatives suited to current technology and concerns.

22. In all diplomatic negotiations, trust and good faith played a determining role. Spain was confident that all States parties to the Treaty were seeking in good faith a global agreement that would include

concessions and compromises for all parties and would allow the international community to set some balanced future-oriented objectives to preserve the NPT regime. Spain, occupying the rotating Presidency of the European Union, would spare no effort to reach such a global agreement.

23. **Mrs. Clinton** (United States of America) said that reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and materials was a central mission of United States foreign policy and that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lay at the core of that mission. In a message addressed to the current Review Conference, President Obama of the United States had pointed out that the Treaty regime was under increasing pressure, which was why a year earlier in Prague he had made it a priority of the United States to strengthen each of the Treaty's key pillars with the aim of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and pursuing the peace and security of a world without them. Noting that the eyes of the world were upon the Review Conference, the President had urged all countries to come together in partnership to pursue a world without nuclear weapons.

24. Admittedly, there were many different perspectives and historical experiences represented in the Conference and there were those who doubted whether nuclear-weapon States, including her own country, were prepared to help lead such an effort. She underscored her country's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and to taking concrete steps towards that end. Her delegation would put forward for the Conference's consideration sincere and serious proposals to advance the fundamental aims of the Treaty and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

25. For her country, linking rights with responsibilities was not just a slogan but rather the guiding principle of its efforts. The United States recognized the rights of all countries in compliance with the Treaty to realize the benefits of nuclear energy and its own responsibility to commit the resources that would help spread those benefits as widely as possible. It also recognized its responsibility as a nuclear-weapon State to move towards disarmament. It was upholding its end of the basic bargain of the Treaty and asked all signatories to do the same by strengthening global non-proliferation rules and holding accountable those who violated them. The mission of the Conference was to create a safer world where future generations could realize their God-given potential without the threat of nuclear proliferation.

26. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty had entered into force in 1970, the world had been at a crossroads, with many asserting that nuclear proliferation was inevitable. However, the Treaty had helped to dispel the darkest predictions of that era and no nuclear weapon had been used in those four decades. The world was once again at a crossroads, facing the prospect of a new wave of proliferation. Once again, there were claims that the spread of nuclear weapons was unavoidable and that the world must learn to live with the fear and instability resulting from an increase in the number of nuclear-armed States and networks.

27. The vast majority of States were living up to their non-proliferation obligations, but a few had demonstrated a determination to violate the rules and defy the international community. During the past decade, one State had said it was withdrawing from the NPT after being caught cheating and had subsequently announced two nuclear tests. Another had cynically claimed to be abiding by the Treaty while violating safeguards, expanding its enrichment programme, failing to cooperate with IAEA, and ignoring the injunctions of the Security Council.

28. In the face of such challenges, most nations had the opportunity to choose a different path. In that connection, the message that the United States President had delivered in Prague in 2009 had a new urgency. Rules must be binding, violations must be punished, words must mean something, and the world must stand together to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The time had come for a strong international response at the current Review Conference.

29. The review conferences held every five years for the past four decades had too often fractured along familiar lines: nuclear-weapon States versus non-nuclear-weapon States, or the Western group versus the Non-Aligned Movement. Instead of working together to meet a common challenge, States parties had retreated into predictable positions to protect their presumed interests. The current review conference must be different.

30. Obviously, some countries would choose not to be constructive. At the preceding meeting, Iran's President had offered the same tired, false, and sometimes wild accusations against the United States and others. Iran would do whatever it could to divert

attention away from its own record and to attempt to evade accountability. Ultimately, however, countries were judged not by how assertively they claimed their rights but by how faithfully they upheld their responsibilities. As the Secretary-General had said, the onus was on Iran in that regard. So far, Iran had failed to meet its burden. Iran was the only country represented at the Conference that had been found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations. It had defied the Security Council and IAEA, and placed the future of the non-proliferation regime in jeopardy. That was why it was facing increasing isolation and pressure from the international community. Iran would not succeed in its efforts to divert and divide. The United States and the great majority of States parties had a much broader agenda: to strengthen a global non-proliferation regime that fostered the security of all nations, and to advance both their rights and their responsibilities. It was time to focus on promoting practical solutions, not pursuing unrealistic goals; and to build consensus, not block it. She called on Iran to join with all the other States parties in fulfilling their international obligations and working towards the goal of a safer world.

31. The stakes were currently as high as when the Treaty had first come into force. States parties must transcend old divisions and set a course for 40 more years of progress to stem the tide of proliferation, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and use nuclear power for the purpose of peace and prosperity.

32. States parties must recommit themselves to strengthening the three pillars of the non-proliferation regime — nuclear disarmament, access to civilian nuclear energy, and non-proliferation. In that respect, the United States had been leading through deeds and not just words, beginning with its efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its own arsenal. Upon taking office, President Obama had recognized that the greatest potential danger facing the United States came from a terrorist group like al-Qaida obtaining a crude nuclear device, not from a global nuclear war. The threats of the twenty-first century could not be addressed with a massive nuclear stockpile. The United States was therefore taking irreversible, transparent and verifiable steps to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The treaty concluded the month before between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction would limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the two countries to levels not seen since the 1950s. The new treaty was consistent with the Secretary-General's call to pursue nuclear disarmament through separate, mutually reinforcing instruments.

33. The Nuclear Posture Review recently conducted by the United States had ruled out the development of new nuclear weapons and new missions and capabilities for existing weapons. It had also confirmed that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that were in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Her country had made a commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and was ready to start multilateral negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Her Government would be seeking the Senate's approval for ratification of protocols for United States participation in nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, giving parties to the relevant agreements a legally binding assurance that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them and that it would fully respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zones. The United States was also prepared to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central and South-East Asia in an effort to reach agreement that would allow it to sign those protocols as well.

34. The United States supported efforts to realize the goal of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Middle East might well represent the greatest current threat of nuclear proliferation. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not universal in the region, and a few countries that were parties had violated their treaty obligations. In spite of such difficulties, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of a Middle East free of such weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to support practical measures towards that end.

35. As the United States President had made clear, the country would retain a nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons existed in order to protect itself and its allies. It would, however, continue to seek further reductions and pursue increased transparency with respect to its nuclear arsenal. The United States

pledged immediately to make public the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile and the number of weapons it had dismantled since 1991.

36. The United States unequivocally supported the rights of States that were in compliance with the Treaty to access to nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes. It had been the biggest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, providing nearly $200 million over the past decade, and would make an additional commitment of $50 million over the next five years for a new IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It hoped that others would match that contribution. The additional resources thus obtained could be used for constructive purposes, including the development of infrastructure for the safe and secure use of nuclear power. She welcomed the emphasis placed by the Director General of IAEA on expanding the use of civil nuclear energy for humanitarian purposes. The United States was also strengthening bilateral technical cooperation arrangements with more than 40 States, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and South-East Asia.

37. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was weakened when any State flouted the rules and developed illicit nuclear-weapon capabilities. Consequently, as States parties pursued progress on the three pillars, they must recommit themselves to bolstering the non-proliferation regime. When IAEA asked for more resources and authority to carry out its verification mission, States parties must respond. When IAEA called on States to sign and ratify an additional protocol to ensure that parties to the NPT were meeting their treaty obligations, States parties must act.

38. Improving the ability of IAEA to detect safeguard violations was not enough. Potential violators must know that they would pay a high price for breaking the rules. The international community's record of enforcing compliance in recent years was unacceptable. There should be automatic penalties for the violation of safeguards agreements, including the suspension of all international nuclear cooperation until compliance was restored. All possible financial and legal tools should be used to disrupt illicit proliferation networks. That meant tightening controls on trans-shipment and restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology. There was also a need to find ways to dissuade States from utilizing the Treaty's withdrawal provision to avoid accountability.

39. The United States was not proposing to amend the Treaty to limit the right of States to withdraw. However, it was unacceptable for a State committing treaty violations to say it would withdraw from the Treaty in an attempt to escape penalties and even pursue nuclear weapons. Parties to the Treaty had invested decades in building a global non-proliferation regime, and that work would be rendered meaningless if the international community continued to allow nations to break the rules with impunity.

40. The 2010 Review Conference must provide a foundation for future actions, including the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and stronger action by the Security Council against proliferation violations.

41. The past 40 years had proved that nuclear proliferation was not inevitable. The United States believed that it could be stopped, but to do so required all States parties to recognize common dangers and find common ground, to think creatively, and to take practical steps together at the current Conference.

42. Sceptics said that when countries gathered at the United Nations, nothing happened but many words were used up. It was for the current Review Conference to prove those doubters wrong. In 40 years' time the world would mark the eightieth anniversary of the Treaty. The men and women who would gather on that occasion would not remember the words spoken at the current Conference unless those words were matched by actions. Whether the world would be more or less secure depended on the path taken at the current Review Conference and there was no greater reason than that to find a way to act together and to act decisively.

43. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was intrinsically unfair in that it divided the world into "haves" and "have-nots" and was therefore an expression of the imbalances in the international system produced in an era when military might, especially nuclear weapons, had been the main, if not the sole source, of prestige and political power. The perception that nuclear arms were a means to political prominence had been reinforced by the unfortunate identification of the permanent members of the Security Council with the five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Treaty. Article VI of the Treaty offered a possibility of correcting that

destructive imbalance, but it had never been duly implemented.

44. Brazil was convinced that the best guarantee for non-proliferation was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, because as long as some States possessed nuclear arms, other States would be tempted to acquire or develop them. At the 2000 Review Conference, negotiations with the nuclear-weapon States, led largely by the New Agenda Coalition, of which Brazil was a member, had resulted in a forward-looking and realistic programme of action, which had come to be known as "the 13 steps to disarmament". The Review Conference had agreed, among other measures, on an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, but that pledge and many others had remain unfulfilled.

45. In an effort to achieve implementation of the 13 steps, the New Agenda Coalition had subsequently submitted a working paper with more than a dozen recommendations on nuclear disarmament aimed at adding credibility to the Treaty through, inter alia, a clear commitment of no-first use by the possessor States, legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the renunciation of activities aimed at upgrading or developing new nuclear devices.

46. There had recently been a few positive steps, including the commitment the preceding year by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to a nuclear free world; the United States President's speech in Prague providing fresh encouragement for those who pursued the total elimination of nuclear arsenals; and the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, which had been a limited step in the right direction. Brazil also welcomed the conceptual advances in the new United States Nuclear Posture Review, mainly in relation to negative security assurances, and the commitment by the United States Government to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

47. In April in Washington leaders from more than 40 countries had confirmed their willingness to tackle issues related to nuclear security, and several speakers, including the President of Brazil, had asserted that the most effective way to reduce the risks of misuse of nuclear materials by non-State actors was the total and irreversible elimination of all nuclear arsenals.

48. However, unilateral and piecemeal measures would not lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament required comprehensive and verifiable steps, and a precise and realistic timetable. The days of mutually assured destruction (MAD) were long gone, but, paradoxically, the mindset of that era seemed to linger on, despite the fact that nuclear weapons were of no use in addressing current security threats. They could not combat transnational crime, prevent ethnic and religious conflicts, or curb cyber-war or terrorism. A world in which the existence of nuclear weapons continued to be accepted was intrinsically insecure.

49. Legitimate concern to promote non-proliferation must not hinder the exercise of the right to peaceful nuclear activities, and no country should be denied the right to peaceful nuclear activities as long as it complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed IAEA requirements. Doubts about implementation of the Treaty by specific countries must, to the maximum extent possible, be dealt with through dialogue and negotiation.

50. Ten years prior to acceding to the Treaty, Brazil had enshrined in its Constitution the prohibition of nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes. Even before that, Brazil and Argentina had engaged in an unprecedented confidence-building process by implementing a comprehensive control and accounting system for nuclear materials. The Brazilian-Argentine model of cooperation should be an inspiration for other countries and regions. Brazil was also proud to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited part of the planet.

51. Any commitments additional to those prescribed in the NPT must be considered in the light of the Treaty's overall implementation, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. The world would be a safe place only when all countries felt that they were being treated with fairness and respect and when the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and discrimination, were overcome. Nuclear weapons bred instability and insecurity and deepened the sense of injustice. The international community could not wait another five years to translate the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world into concrete political action.

52. **Mr. Verhagen** (Netherlands) said that the Review Conference should seize the opportunities presented by the announcement by the United States that it would take concrete steps towards achievement of a world without nuclear weapons and by the signing, in April 2010, of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation.

53. The best way to develop broad-based disarmament and non-proliferation measures was to strengthen the system of international treaties based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the ideas on which that instrument were based were as vital and relevant as ever. His delegation welcomed the conclusion of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as a sign that the two largest nuclear-weapon States were assuming their moral responsibility to lead the complex disarmament process, although there should be no illusions: that goal could not be achieved overnight.

54. Since non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing, the non-nuclear-weapon States also had a role to play. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had begun consideration of a phased reduction of the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, and his delegation suggested that the American sub-strategic nuclear weapons on that continent should be a subject of discussion between the United States and the Russian Federation.

55. Some 20 years after the end of the cold war, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was unacceptable to his country and to the people of the world. He was grateful to the United States President for organizing the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., on 12 and 13 April 2010, which had demonstrated the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Additional protocols should be an integral part of the international safeguards system, which should be enhanced in response to new developments and insights. Countries such as Iran should meet the demands of IAEA; the unfounded and unacceptable accusations made by the President of that country at the previous meeting were not helpful for the current debate. In that regard, he associated himself with the remarks made by the representative of Luxembourg.

56. The Treaty was too important for the attention of the Review Conference to be monopolized by the issue of Iran. The many States that had decided to make use of nuclear energy also deserved the attention and cooperation of the international community, which should have the means to verify the peaceful use of such energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. His own country's nuclear facilities were equipped with stringent safeguards and had been opened to peer review, and he called on all other States to take similar steps. Verification and compliance were pivotal for building trust, and failure to agree on measures for dealing with cases of non-compliance in a resolute, comprehensive manner would undermine the Treaty's integrity. Only when the nuclear safeguards system had been strengthened would the international community be able to capitalize on the current "nuclear spring".

57. Nuclear energy was a legitimate option for meeting future energy demands. Secure fuel supplies and secure access to them were key for States with nuclear power programmes. In order to ensure that the development of nuclear power met the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, the issue of supply security must be properly addressed. His Government had always supported talks and efforts related to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and would continue to seek dialogue with all concerned parties. Such initiatives did not infringe on any State's rights; on the contrary, they could promote the exercise of States' inherent right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Lastly, he expressed his appreciation of the work done by IAEA, which must be enabled to continue its efforts.

58. **Mr. Spindelegger** (Austria) said that when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had entered into force 40 years earlier, the world had been in the depths of the cold war. At times, the threat of nuclear war had seemed imminent. The goals of the Treaty were, however, clear: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to pursue nuclear disarmament.

59. Forty years later, it was deeply disturbing that so many nuclear weapons were still in existence; that North Korea had developed nuclear arms; and that, in spite of requests by IAEA and the United Nations, Iran was still not able or willing to dispel concerns about its nuclear ambitions.

60. In its 40 years of existence the Treaty had produced resolutions and decisions, high hopes and aspirations, and yet, the international community was still waiting for progress on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and for negotiations on a fissile material ban. In those 40 years, there had been dangerous incidents, a terrible accident in Chernobyl, and growing concerns over the misuse of sensitive nuclear technologies, and yet there was still no prospect of real solutions for environmental and health concerns, no universal commitment to recognize the IAEA Additional Protocol as the verification standard, and no real interest in safe and fair multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle through IAEA. Nevertheless, the inadequacies of the system must not be used to detract from the overall positive record. Since 1970, few new States had acquired nuclear weapons. Some States were giving up or reducing nuclear arsenals and dismantling weapons programmes. IAEA had established a highly efficient system of monitoring and verification and become the accepted authority on nuclear issues.

61. The most important sign of the Treaty's relevance was the 2010 Review Conference itself, at which almost the whole world had gathered to support the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. A review conference was an occasion to reflect on the past, but it should also focus on the future. There was a sense of optimism — thanks primarily to the inspirational approach of the President of the United States, which had made possible the signing of a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms by the Russian Federation and the United States just one month earlier. It was to be hoped that the improved atmosphere would lead to concrete steps forward at the Review Conference, especially with regard to the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the nuclear test ban, a fissile material ban, the Additional Protocol, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and confidence-building. Progress required positive contributions by everyone, not confrontational rhetoric.

62. Austria would, as in the past, actively contribute to a successful outcome, for example with its proposal on a fair and transparent system for multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most important for Austria was that the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world should become the central objective of the international community's endeavours. Such ideas had been considered idealistic dreams 40 years earlier, but just the preceding year the Security Council had embraced the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

63. Moving from the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons to actual "global zero" would take time and much effort. There were several promising ideas, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Five-Point Plan, which Austria supported. The most effective way to move towards "global zero" was through a universal legal instrument establishing a strict multilateral verification mechanism.

64. Austria was serious about disarmament issues and had been at the forefront of initiatives resulting in conventions banning mines and cluster bombs. The Austrian Government and legislature — which had recently adopted a formal resolution on a world without nuclear weapons — would be closely watching how disarmament was dealt with at the Review Conference. If there was no clear progress towards "global zero", it would explore with others the feasibility of a global instrument to ban nuclear weapons. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, a static regime that has lost its vision might benefit from fresh ideas.

65. A meaningful outcome at the Conference would require contributions from many quarters. With no nuclear weapons to disarm, no international treaties left to ratify and no nuclear industry to monitor, Austria had sought to identify ways in which it might still make a contribution. The Austrian Government had decided to offer office space, equipment, a yearly stipend to offset personnel costs for 10 years and financial support for conferences in order to enable the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to establish and maintain a permanent liaison office in Vienna, which would enable it to devote more attention to the meetings on nuclear issues in Vienna. A presence close to institutions such as IAEA and CTBTO would also help UNODA to provide support to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially if a support unit for the NPT-review process along the lines of the Canadian proposal was established. Austria also firmly believed that strengthening of the monitoring role of civil society could further the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. It therefore intended to assist in establishing in Vienna an international hub of expertise in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It would consult in

the months ahead with Governments and civil society on how such a hub could contribute effectively to the global efforts for a world without nuclear weapons.

66. **Mr. Cannon** (Canada) said that at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010, the 47 participating countries had recognized nuclear terrorism as a significant security threat and expressed their commitment to enhancing nuclear security. On that occasion, by advancing non-proliferation as a theme for the upcoming Summit of the Group of Eight Canada had demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, would not spread to States or terrorists that were prepared to use them under any circumstances. At a meeting in Gatineau in March, the Group's Foreign Ministers had issued a Statement on Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy as a co...ibution to the 2010 Review Conference.

67. IAEA safeguards were a fundamental element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. While there had been progress since the 2005 Review Conference, 21 States parties had yet to sign and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. Moreover, the nature and scope of the Agency's annual conclusions, particularly with respect to the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities, was limited for States that had only a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. That deficiency had been addressed through the IAEA Board of Governors' approval of additional protocols to safeguards agreements. The Conference should therefore recognize that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the new verification standard.

68. Canada remained a strong supporter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The inalienable right of all States parties to develop research on and produce and use such energy for peaceful purposes, affirmed in article IV of the Treaty, was explicitly linked with the compliance requirements established in articles I, II and III thereof.

69. There had been several recent challenges to the authority and integrity of the Treaty. He called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had demonstrated its complete disregard for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives by announcing its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, to re-accede to that instrument, dismantle it weapons programme in a complete, verif irreversible manner and accept comprehens safeguards on its nuclear programmes. Furth the morning meeting, the Secretary-General it clear that the onus was on Iran to dissipa and concerns about its nuclear ambitions unfortunate that the President of Iran had d ignore that invitation by delivering a predic aggressive statement. Iran's extensive past u nuclear activities, together with its efforts t the full nuclear fuel cycle without any j reason, suggested that it was seeking to d nuclear weapons capability that was contra Treaty commitments. Immediate and cessation of its uranium enrichment an proliferation-sensitive activities in accordance obligations to the Security Council and IAE provide the only objective indicator of the nature of its nuclear programme.

70. Regional security was a crucial consider States that remained outside the Trea Government supported efforts to bring peac Middle East and to make it a zone free of we mass destruction. His delegation called upon States which had yet to accede to the Treaty to non-nuclear-weapon States.

71. He drew attention to a working paper "Other provisions: institutional reform, art (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42), submitted by to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Conference and sponsored by a cross-regional 17 States, which proposed specific decisions further strengthening the review process and m more responsive to States parties. His delegatio welcome further sponsors and hoped that the d proposed therein would be reflected in the document of the Review Conference.

72. The numerous challenges that fac Conference should not be a cause for pessim lack of ambition, but rather an incentive to ea party to display the political will and fl necessary to arrive at a strong and balanced that would reinforce the Treaty. The Conferen taking place at a time of challenge, but also of optimism and great opportunity. That opp should be seized.

73. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) reaffirmed his Government's commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and its belief that the Treaty, as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, delivered tangible security dividends for all States parties. The fundamental bargain that underpinned the Treaty — the pledge by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons; the commitment by nuclear-weapon States to pursue disarmament; and guaranteed access to peaceful nuclear energy for all States parties — was as valid as it had been in 1970. The fact that no nuclear weapon had been used in anger since the end of the Second World War owed much to the Treaty.

74. The Review Conference must reaffirm the States parties' shared commitment to the Treaty's core principles and must achieve outcomes that strengthened non-proliferation and disarmament and facilitated access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The goal of a world without nuclear weapons could not be achieved without commitment to action by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The former must commit themselves to that goal, exercise leadership and chart the course to the abolition of nuclear weapons, while the latter must comply with their Treaty obligations and IAEA safeguards agreements and work to strengthen the Treaty's non-proliferation regime. His Government supported the right of States parties to participate in the development of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that reduced proliferation risk and adhered to the highest international safeguards standards.

75. His Government's commitment to a successful Review Conference was reflected by its accomplishments in the lead-up to the event. In 2008, Australia and Japan had established the independent International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Commission's report, released in December 2009, contained thoughtful analysis and recommendations for action on the critical issues. Together with Japan, Australia had also submitted to the Conference a working paper entitled "New package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9).

76. The Conference was taking place at a time of growing momentum towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. He congratulated the United States and the Russian Federation on the signing of their new Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and commended France and the United Kingdom on the unilateral steps that they had taken in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals from cold war heights. The Nuclear Posture Review recently released by the United States also sent a clear signal of commitment to progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.

77. The Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 had highlighted the need to secure nuclear materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. His Government hoped that that momentum could be sustained and accelerated and would like to see further, deeper, verifiable and irreversible cuts in all nuclear arsenals and a continuing reduction of their role in national security strategies. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would be a major step forward for disarmament. He urged States that had not yet signed and ratified that Treaty to do so and welcomed the Secretary-General's strong commitment, expressed in his opening address to the Conference, to its entry into force. He also encouraged all States to support the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

78. Despite that positive momentum, however, there were also troubling developments. His Government remained deeply concerned at Iran's nuclear programme and called on that State to cooperate fully with IAEA and to abide by IAEA and Security Council resolutions. It also called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which claimed to have withdrawn from the Treaty, to resume international negotiations and return to full compliance with that instrument and the associated safeguards agreement.

79. The best way to bolster compliance was to ensure that IAEA had the means to provide credible assurances that a State party had no undeclared or covert facilities and that its nuclear programme was implemented for peaceful purposes. A comprehensive safeguards agreement, combined with an additional protocol, should be recognized as the basic standard of verification. His Government had made adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for Australian uranium and encouraged other States parties to take a similar approach. It believed that the issues of non-compliance and withdrawal must be adequately addressed, if necessary by the Security Council, in

accordance with the Council's role under the Charter of the United Nations. He reiterated his Government's commitment to a universal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on those States that were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions.

80. His Government recognized the importance of implementing the 1995 resolution on a verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and regretted that there had been no movement on that issue. It stood ready to support constructive efforts by States parties with a view to implementation of the resolution.

81. The enduring health of the Treaty and its contribution to collective security could be maintained only if States parties displayed the necessary political will and took concrete action to meet all their obligations and commitments. The participants owed current and future generations a world free from nuclear weapons.

82. **Mr. Fihri** (Morocco) said that while there had been significant challenges to the Treaty during the preceding decade, recent developments such as the United States President's landmark speech in Prague, the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and several other non-proliferation initiatives had created a climate favourable to reinvigoration of the international nuclear regime. His country believed that the States parties to the Treaty should rise above disputes over the interpretation of particular provisions and focus on the spirit of the Treaty's objectives. He urged States to fulfil obligations deriving from the Treaty and the review conferences, and, in particular, called for effective implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference.

83. As one of the coordinators, along with France, of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, his country called on annex II countries to ratify that Treaty without delay. It was regrettable that, 15 years after its adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had yet to be implemented. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would be an important confidence-building measure for the countries of the region and therefore an important step towards strengthening international peace and security. The international community should not tolerate any attempts to violate the Treaty, and should also act to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime.

84. Given the rise in global energy demand combined with the problems associated with fossil fuels, alternative energy sources such as nuclear energy were of increasing strategic and economic importance. The non-proliferation regime should not infringe on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as provided for in article IV of the Treaty. He called on the international community to build on the outcome of the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy, held in Paris in March 2010, and to make full use of the potential contribution of peaceful uses of nuclear technology to economic and social development. He welcomed the statements made by the United States Secretary of State, and expressed the hope that a positive outcome to the Conference would restore credibility to the Treaty.

85. **Mr. Baconschi** (Romania) paid tribute to the many States parties that were implementing the provisions of, and meeting their obligations under the Treaty. He recognized that it was difficult to meet the disarmament commitments of the past while seeking to strengthen global security and stressed the need to improve the nuclear technology capable of ensuring public and environmental safety. In the light of such challenges, States parties must work together to strengthen support for the Treaty, which, while it had one of the highest accession rates of any international instrument, was vulnerable and often put to the test. Multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation were the key to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The world expected States parties to keep their promises and the participants must make every effort to avoid another failure.

86. His Government viewed the Treaty as an essential instrument of collective security. Its three interrelated pillars were the appropriate framework for preserving and strengthening international peace and security while benefiting from the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. It was in all States' interest to support the Treaty, preserve its integrity and validity, and further strengthen it.

87. His Government was of the opinion that nuclear energy had the potential to be a reliable, sustainable and environmentally friendly energy source, provided that its use was beneficial, responsible and sustainable. The safeguards system was the instrument by which Romania accepted IAEA control over all nuclear raw materials and special fissionable materials. Those materials were used in all peaceful nuclear-related activities on Romania's territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The sole purpose of the safeguards system was to verify that those materials were not diverted to nuclear weapons or related activities.

88. International cooperation with and technical assistance from IAEA was and would continue to be instrumental for developing Romania's nuclear programme. His country had benefited from international support and had undertaken fully to implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the IAEA Additional Protocol. It was in the interest of all States that a safeguards agreement coupled with an additional protocol should become the Agency's verification standard.

89. As noted in the working paper on the repatriation of all Russian-origin fresh highly enriched uranium as well as spent fuel from Romania (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.3), submitted by Romania and the Russian Federation, all highly enriched uranium of Russian origin had been removed from Romanian territory in 2009 in a joint operation conducted with the help of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA. Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, all the spent highly enriched uranium fuel from the Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) research reactor had been returned to the United States, its country of origin, in 2009.

90. He appealed to all States parties to show flexibility, look beyond national and regional interests and make way for a larger picture of peace, security and prosperity for present and future generations. Differences of opinion should not be feared, but it should be borne in mind that a positive outcome of the Conference would show the parties' political will to deal successfully with nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

91. **Mr. Mladenov** (Bulgaria) said that halting the spread of nuclear weapons was a mission that transcended politics and diplomacy, national ambitions and personal egos. It was a universal obligation and a joint commitment assumed by States parties to the Treaty, which, at a critical juncture for the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, must either seize the opportunity to reverse the spread of nuclear weapons and build momentum for their ultimate elimination, or prolong the period of indecision during which those who sought to challenge the Treaty would grow stronger and more dangerous.

92. The current Review Conference could not be seen as "business as usual"; the 2005 Conference had closed without substantive agreement on the tough challenges facing the Treaty. Every nation must put a strengthened Treaty at the centre of its national diplomacy and take steps to help achieve the goals of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology in the knowledge that no country could achieve them on its own. The disagreements and procedural wrangling that had too often led to gridlock must be set aside. Failure was not an option; universal adherence to the Treaty must be a universal priority and States that were not parties should be invited to apply comprehensive IAEA safeguards to all their civilian nuclear activities and to cease manufacturing nuclear weapons and related materials.

93. A new sense of urgency had emerged since the 2005 Review Conference; the uncovering of clandestine nuclear networks had raised the spectre of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear non-proliferation regime would be undermined if violators were allowed to act with impunity. For the first time, a signatory had announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and had renewed its programme for producing highly enriched uranium. All States parties, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, were bound by their Treaty obligations and withdrawal could not be without consequences. He therefore urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with all its international obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA standards and to resume negotiations with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

94. There were justified concerns about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which should comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA standards and safeguards fully, unconditionally, unequivocally and without delay.

Anything short of full compliance should be unacceptable. The international community had made important efforts to reach out to Iran, and he joined other members of the European Union which had called on its Government to respond positively. Ratification and application of the additional protocol already signed by Iran would be a major step in that direction. States parties should also reaffirm their commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, building on the successful establishment of such zones in Africa and Central Asia.

95. It was crucial to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. States parties should therefore call for full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2005) and should reaffirm that expert controls were an essential instrument of non-proliferation while rejecting the false assumption that they impeded cooperation and the transfer of technology. The Conference should also welcome the supporting role of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in upholding the non-proliferation regime.

96. Nuclear security was absolutely necessary to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. Hundreds of tons of weapons-usable fissile material that could be potential targets for sabotage, misuse, or diversion and millions of radioactive sources scattered across the globe were not tightly protected. The Conference should therefore call for the securing of the world's vulnerable fissile material.

97. All States must recognize that strengthening the Treaty was a joint endeavour to be backed by specific action. He welcomed the recent release of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States Government and the latter's commitment to seeking ways to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe and secure deterrent capability; the signing of the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia; the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, at which measures to reduce the threat of nuclear attack had been discussed; the renewed commitment by the United States President to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and his efforts to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; and the announcement by the United States Secretary of State, at the current meeting, of greater transparency with respect to her country's nuclear stockpile.

98. In order for the 2010 Review Conference to succeed, States parties must not shy away from their most important goals: to strengthen the IAEA verification instruments, enhance the enforcement measures of the non-proliferation regime and tighten the withdrawal provisions of the Treaty so that it could not be abused by non-compliant States. His Government believed that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol were key to the current IAEA verification standard. In view of modern security challenges and the danger of terrorist organizations acquiring nuclear devices, strengthening the Treaty's principles and safeguards constituted a precious tool for countering nuclear terrorism. The States parties had gathered at the Conference in good faith and with a shared conviction to work towards "global zero", and he urged them to take advantage of that historic opportunity to reverse the spread of nuclear weapons and build momentum for their ultimate elimination.

99. **Mr. Natalagawa** (Indonesia) said that failure to achieve progress towards disarmament was due to the failure of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to live up to their commitments. All parties needed to abandon the intransigent positions of the past and focus on bridging differences. There had been some positive developments, including the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation and recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States. The Conference provided an opportunity to build on such developments. He was pleased to inform the Conference that his country was initiating the procedure for ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

100. It was crucial for nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments under the Treaty and, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Proliferation threats needed to be addressed without a double standard. In particular, Israel needed to be prevailed upon to join the Treaty and a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be established in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported, and there could be no justification for any nuclear energy cooperation with States that were adding to proliferation momentum. On the other hand, the inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, as provided for in article IV of the Treaty, should be respected, and IAEA should be strengthened in order to be able to fulfil its mandate in that regard. All three pillars of the Treaty should be approached in a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory fashion. Ultimately, a universal convention with a specific timeline for full disarmament should be adopted, because the only guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used was their complete elimination.

101. **The Chairman** welcomed the announcement by Indonesia that it was initiating the ratification process for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

102. **Ms. Calmy-Rey** (Switzerland) said that the Treaty was at a crossroads. The new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit had been positive developments. But recent adjustments to the nuclear postures of the two biggest nuclear States had still failed to address the fundamental question of why, two decades after the end of the cold war, nuclear deterrence still remained part of their military doctrines at all. Nuclear weapons were as useless against nuclear-armed States that possessed second-strike capability as they were against terrorist groups that would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear reprisal. They were also immoral because of the indiscriminate harm they could cause to human beings and the environment, and illegal under international humanitarian law.

103. Her country hoped that the Conference would adopt an action plan to rekindle momentum for disarmament by building on the achievements of previous conferences, and in particular by updating the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference along the lines proposed by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Disarmament should no longer be treated as the "poor relation" of the Treaty's other two pillars, and action should be taken to dispel doubts about the ability of IAEA to prevent proliferation. The expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the coming decades was inevitable, and the Conference needed to adopt clear language reaffirming the link between the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes and the obligation to ensure nuclear security and safety.

104. Beyond achieving a successful resolution of the issues immediately at hand, the Conference needed to move forward to a vision of a world where the use of nuclear weapons had no place whatsoever in the military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States. For Switzerland it was important to uphold a humanitarian perspective in the current discussion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons should be banned completely by a new convention along the lines proposed by the Secretary-General. Switzerland had prepared a study on delegitimizing nuclear weapons, which it would present in an upcoming side event.

105. States and civil society alike had a role to play in translating into reality the vision of a world where nuclear weapons did not exist and where nuclear energy was used responsibly. The Conference must foster a dialogue leading beyond the current crossroad for the NPT.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.